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Writing Cultural Differences into the Law 
Dilip Yogasundrum 
The assertion of minority rights here in Canada tends nowadays to find its justification in 
a language of "cultural difference." That language involves more than merely calling for 
the recognition of values that lie outside of, and present a challenge to, a dominant norm; 
it also involves reevaluating and displacing the terms of prospective inclusion given under 
the principle of "diversity." When social justice is prosecuted through the law in affirma- 
tive action programmes ("employment and pay equity" in Ontario), and in the judicial 
review of discriminatory legislation (spousal benefits for same-sex couples, for example), 
the state is involved in a pragmatic administration of consensus, conducted in the name of 
diversity. The suspicion we might direct towards "diversity" concerns a double standard 
which works to contain the disruptive value of cultural differences - by their recognition 
as heterogeneous social facts which do not themselves set the universal terms of recogni- 
tion, and by the effacement of the state's normative position from which such a universal 
recognition of nominally equal facts is constructed. 
The question of cultural difference gets its broadest articulation in the debate within 
the humanities over the worth of vernacular traditions long considered to be minor or irrel- 
evant within a certain canonical understanding of Western culture. Let me use the essay by 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., that introduces the collection "Race," Writing, and Difference to draw 
out the implications of writing minority values into the law. The virtue of Gates's introduc- 
tion is that he very quickly describes the dilemma of black writing, and in so doing 
sketches the form taken by the double standard implicit within the principle of diversity. 
Gates records some consequences of the Enlightenment's privileging of a reflective rea- 
son, where writing became the material sign of reason's presence. Peoples ostensibly with- 
out writing were said to be without reason, and, without those repeatable and visible signs 
of reason, to have no collective memory or history of their own, no self-consciousness. 
For black slaves in the United States to be ascribed no cultural history served to jus- 
tify their continued exclusion from becoming juridical subjects. Slaves were prevented 
from writing - by law in some states - and those who wrote in spite of such adversity 
became the subject of arguments over the humanity of black people in general. Slave writ- 
ing was a commodity exchanged from the margins of an economy of historical self-con- 
sciousness, a means of contradicting the purported absence of such a consciousness. 
"Writing, for these slaves, was not an activity of mind; rather, it was a commodity which 
they were forced to trade for their humanity."' But if slave writing was not a detached 
"activity of mind," this act of contradiction was also a writing into self-consciousness, a 
production of subjectivity which negotiated those commodified margins by undertaking 
the inscription of the material signs of reason. 
Gates phrases the conditions of black writing in the form of an ironic dilemma: "How 
can the black subject posit a full and sufficient self in a language in which blackness is a 
sign of ab~ence?"~  Africans and Africa stood for what the project of human reason had left 
behind. For black writing, if the presence of subjectivity is not to be qualified by blackness, 
by race - if subjectivity is something that black people share in the same measure as whites, 
but whose expression has been denied, if it is something distinct or detachable from the 
signification of blackness as absence - then that subjectivity is presupposed as a universal 
possibility. But insofar as subjectivity is also something which institutes itself differentially 
in language, through invested signs of its presence and absence, such a universal subjectiv- 
ity must efface in itself the traces of the differential signs which constituted its presence. 
Writing, for African Americans, therefore "stood as a complex 'certificate of human- 
 it^."'^ Their writing would always have to address and overcome the signs that differ- 
entiated them as an absence. To a degree, black writing beholden to a universal standard 
subjects itself further to the effects of that racism by having to demonstrate the "same" 
humanity, the "same" historical capacity, as whites. Aesthetic considerations would 
become secondary to a moral question. Such writing would always have to show that it 
could be as good as or the same as European writing, would always stand before an exter- 
nal judge whose normative view does not acknowledge any debt to black writing. 
If, on the other hand, black writing displays another subjectivity, if there is something 
like a b1uck subjectivity, then this exists, from the standpoint of the dominant culture, as 
fragmentary and heterogeneous in the diaspora of the New World. How would one bear 
witness, from an Afrocentric standpoint, to the subjugation of African cultures, to the 
adaptation and reincorporation of their legal codes, to the destruction of their conditions 
of existence, all carried out in the name of the the civilizing values of the West? 
A reconstructive writing that would recapture a singularly Afrocentric subjectivity 
or seek to establish blackness as a positive aesthetic would have to distinguish itself deci- 
sively from those Western values. But what is specific to that black aesthetic does not 
present itself as empirically given in what persists of a culture experiencing the disloca- 
tion of slavery. Which idioms are to be recognized and valued as distinctively Afrocen- 
tric? What has been lost in translation? Who is invested with authority to speak? These 
are all questions for a judgement that is as much juridical as aesthetic. To base the speci- 
ficity of a black subjectivity on the extant aesthetic signs of blackness - signs which are 
already invested by their relationship to an economy of self-consciousness constituting 
blackness as other - feeds into an exoticism which does not displace the limit that places 
blackness outside. 
Black writing is caught between these two poles: of anticipating a subjectivity which 
it has been denied, but which, through its inscription, will demonstrate that that subjec- 
tivity was there all along; and recovering a subjectivity which will have funded a future 
horizon distinct from the particular subjectivity of the West. 
Paradoxically, the aftermath of the Enlightenment also brought with it the thinking of 
just these questions within the West, in discourses which saw European freedom at home 
as compatible with colonialism and slavery. The emergence of the romantic discourse of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century marks an attempt to embody the space and time of 
signs taken to reflect reason, to plot the political and cultural unity of self-consciousness 
and self-determination while differentiating itself from others. 
As Benedict Anderson and Homi Bhabha point out, the post-Enlightenment nation 
describes an ambivalent entity.4 The dispersion of arbitrary and contingent signs - culture 
- is understood, within nationalist discourse, to reflect an internal necessity marking the 
integrity of a people with a historical self-consciousness. On the other hand, the principle 
of this self-recognition and necessity is itself constituted in the project of a nation to realize 
itself in a state, and this is performed in those cultural signs of its will. Anderson's oft-cited 
comment on the double-sidedness of the nation-state is apt: "If nation-states are widely 
conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political expression 
always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless 
future."> The nation-state describes an entity pulled in two directions at the same time: 
the particular cultural gestures of the nation signify a communal past which, as a constitu- 
tive origin, enables the future universality of a self-determining will and self-conscious 
reason; while simultaneously the inscription of those gestures anticipates the universality 
which would retrospectively authorize their rootedness in a misty past. The discourse 
of nationalism, then, produces itself through an ambivalence which it seeks to rule out: 
its constitutive origins are both presupposed and must be realized in a universal self- 
consciousness. 
Gates locates the solution to this ambivalence of romantic nationalist discourse, at 
least in literary study, in the moment of formalism, and this moment is instructive pre- 
cisely because it takes on a legal form, which will allow us to return to the issue of diversity. 
Gates cites T.S. Eliot's ordering of the Western literary canon to include those texts 
said to embody the elevation of culture. In principle, that elevation is impartial, belong- 
ing to no one culture exclusively: transcending the intentional and parochial conditions 
that occasioned them, these texts speak out of, and to, the element of their universality 
(as expressed in such values as the "human condition," and so on). Considerations such as 
race, history, or other embodied differences now describe mere particularities and there- 
fore fall away in significance faced with a reason common to all humanity. Nevertheless, 
the particular expression of such transcendent values of a universal human reason could 
be identified, their milieu interpreted and their history located, only through a philologi- 
cal and etymological analysis of their appearance. 
In Gates's gloss on literary formalism, the language of the canon, then, is both the 
medium of universality, bringing its values into play, as well as the repository of an inher- 
itance through which that universality can be recognized. The revelation that values 
can be free from particularity is enabled by a turn towards the formal patterns through 
which the expression of those values is achieved. 
The implications of this gloss are that the canon reveals its literary objects as instances 
of constitutive values which are themselves given in signification; and it is because signi- 
fication and constitution are presumed to share the same universal form and reflect each 
other in language that this is possible. 
In one sense then, the form of reflection implicit in the canon is not beholden to a 
particular tradition; it claims to achieve a transparent identification of constitution with 
signification, presenting that achievement as a universal tradition, the common inheri- 
tance "of us all." 
But in another sense, the act of reflection roots itself in a particular tradition insofar 
as the fomz of that reflection has been elaborated by those discourses - legal, literary, 
philosophical, theological, and others - which describe the complex project of the West 
emanating out of both the Judaeo-Christian and the Graeco-Roman traditions. The dis- 
course of nationalism forms part of this history. 
In yet another sense, reflection is not traditional at all, insofar as the relationship 
between constitutive values and signification is not given, but rather is itself the subject 
of reflection and the object of a discovery. The (self-)understanding of the West and its 
limits opens itself up to critical inquiry: such an openness, at least, is a hope which legiti- 
mates its cultural practice and claim to universality. In interrogating its limits for the 
signs of its constitution, reflection orients itself to an outside and to a future, so that its 
form is always in the process of being completed. 
If reflection is not beholden to given traditions, to its Western past, this past is never- 
theless positioned at its centre as a virtuality - about to be actualized, and yet, having to 
be actualized, not yet centred. From this standpoint, the form of reflection which emerges 
through the discourses of the West can be said to consist in the (re)discovery of (its own) 
universality in a chain of signifying and constitutive values. 
The ethnocentrism of the West would operate, then, by effacing the constitution of 
the universal subject of reflection, a constitution which nevertheless remains active, pro- 
ducing itself in relation to an outside which it institutes as the site for the discovery of 
new signifying values. Universality is indicated as the impossibility of presenting a com- 
prehensive solution to the claims of particular signs, so that there is nothing preventing 
the establishment of regional or national canons insofar as they participate in, and become 
watchwords for, the rule of a universal law. 
In terms of cultural difference, the principle of diversity emerges in the recognition 
of the gap between constitutive values and their signification as providing the basis for 
openness and tolerance. The consensus of the liberal state is based on a reason whose con- 
stitution cannot be fathomed as such. Communities and traditions give rise to the pre- 
sumed consensus of the state, but this consensus has no particular cultural representation 
until retroactively identified in the form of individual rights. 
The management of consensus then involves a veering between the assertion that indi- 
vidual rights exist politically and are sufficiently protected by the state, and the discovery 
of social differentials, whose correction will restore the rationality of consensus. 
Issues of social justice dealt with by the liberal state have this appearance of being 
outside its proper concern and at the same time of being the means by which consensus is 
preserved. To have different cultural values outside the protection of the state is to subject 
them to an unfettered economic rationalization, but to protect cultural differences as 
minority rights, codified in a form available for their monitoring by the state, has the fol- 
lowing consequence: the real social gains achieved by the critical pursuit of minority 
tights come at the price of the further commodification and individualization of particular 
cultural differences. 
We can note this briefly with affirmative action and antidiscrimination laws. Often, 
the legitimacy of affirmative action is attacked on the grounds that it restricts the 
possibility of exercising judgement according to evaluative standards dearly held to be 
neutral, efficient, and fair. But even where such judgement can be exposed to have 
been ethnocentric and discriminatory in practice, the necessity of affirmative action is 
defended as a regrettable stopgap measure needed to redress past irrationalities and to 
restore a level playing field. This is because the level playing field can only ever be a 
regulative ideal for the state: the state is not in the business of giving a stereotyped sub- 
stantive representation of that ideal society, which would abrogate the state's formal uni- 
versality and reveal itself as once more ethnocentric. 
Similarly, when antidiscrimination protections ate instituted, they usually come under 
attack either for restricting free judgement and expression or for undermining tradi- 
tional cultural norms and values. When such protections are defended, it is in the name 
of tolerating conduct which, beyond the particular form the conduct takes, evinces a 
rational character. This rational character is governed, in the dogma of the liberal state, 
by two sometimes contradictory impulses: individuals should be free to choose their mode 
of personal fulfilment; and the connections into which they enter to that end should be 
protected if those connections, associations, communities, and so on, are not inimical to 
social utility. But, again, social utility and individual fulfilment can be given no fixed 
cultural form. 
Hence, it is only through a case-by-case demonstration of the rational basis of partic- 
ular cultural differences that recognition of those differences is awarded and the principle 
of diversity maintained. Of course, the state figures crucially in this process, assuming 
the task of scrutinizing and upholding the fairness and representativeness of the political 
process itself. But since that rationality, whose guardian the state takes itself to be, only 
has a representation in the protection of minority values, the process of adjudicating dif- 
ferences works metonymically to provide a visible guarantee of the state's rational character. 
In this scrutiny of the state, there are two operations to note. The legal recognition of 
differences leaves out something communal about their value in making them equally 
as valid as more dominant values: such a recognition moves towards an abstract general- 
ity. And, insofar as the state becomes involved in making cultural differences the object of 
knowledges identifying the irrational inequality of social position, those differences are 
progressively inscribed into the web of remedial state practices. But these two movements 
operate disjunctively - one towards a formal equivalence of values, the other towards a 
differentiation of social facts - and are attended by continual crises of governability. 
The more the law applies itself to social life as a way of managing it, the more it pro- 
duces a seriality of positive social facts dislodging the cultural difference from its commu- 
nal conditions of existence. The legal codification of social life, undertaken in the attempt 
to recover an equilibrium, the level playing field, produces further discrepancies in the 
social body relative to an original consensus which can never be given a substantial repre- 
sentation. In this respect the law is complicit in the rationalizing of cultural differences 
and the production of surplus social repressions, even as it moves to protect them. But in 
this empowerment of minorities through rights secured, there are relationships of belong- 
ing, of community, produced in the interstices of the double operation of the law. Cultural 
difference affirms names which have not yet been heard, and this means not only what is 
left out in the identification of differences under the principle of diversity, but also an 
affirmation of what is produced as unidentifiable by the state's management of consensus. 
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